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Introduction 
The question of how to tackle the problem of tax ha-
vens has never before been so pressing. In April 2009 
a G20 communique announced the intention to take 
action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, proclaim-
ing themselves to be, ‘ready to deploy sanctions to pro-
tect [their] public finances and financial systems’, and 
the, ‘era of banking secrecy is over.’  This coupled with 
the increasingly corrosive impact of tax avoidance and 
evasion on the tax bases of states that are negotiating 
the politics of austerity has proved fertile grounds for a 
plethora of policy debates and initiatives. While these 
policy debates and processes are nascent, numerous 
and now unfolding, this Brief seeks to take stock of the 
current direction of travel.
The regulation of tax havens has persistently found-
ered on the rocks of territorially bound, mutually ex-
clusive legal authority and increasingly mobile capital. 
Those seeking to ameliorate, what is now widely un-
derstood to be, the deleterious impact of tax havens 
on the world economy face an apparently intractable 
collective action problem. First, each state stands to 
gain from imposing the least exacting tax and regula-
tory requirements upon mobile capital. Second, in the 
absence of unanimity amongst states and uniformity 
in terms of tax and regulation, policy and regulation 
which is not universal will necessarily be gamed. As 
such, delivery on the promise of the G20 seems to rely 
upon a ‘World Tax Authority’ or the closure of national 
borders to economic transactions.
While, harmful tax competition remains rife, with in 
particular recent moves by the UK government stand-
ing out in this regard, one emergent trend seems to 
counter this conclusion and promise more than might 
at first appear. Both the US and the EU are shifting to-
wards unilateral policy as a basis upon which to rein-
vigorate and reinforce what has been a largely ineffec-
tive multilateralism. This involves a new concern with 
establishing rules within their own jurisdictions that 
potentially severely curtail the capacity of individu-
als and corporate entities to simultaneously live or do 
business within their jurisdictions while taking advan-
tage of the differential services offered by tax havens. 
‘Not in my backyard’ seems defeatist and piecemeal, 
but given the combined economic weight of the US 
and the EU appearances in this case may yet prove de-
ceptive. ‘Not in my backyard’ may open the way to an 
effective multilateralism, but by the backdoor.
Information on request as precedent
THE OECD Model Convention and Model Tax Infor-
mation Exchange Agreement (TIEA) require tax in-
formation exchange on request, merely allowing for 
automatic information exchange on separate agree-
ment. The model was published in 2002 by the Global 
forum on Taxation formed in 2001 as a result of the 
OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices Project. Under a TIEA 
a government can only request information on a spe-
cific and named taxpayer who can be shown to have 
given due reason for suspicion. Further, the investigat-
ing tax administration would need to know in which 
jurisdiction the individual held an account and with 
which specific financial institution the account is held. 
Obvious limitations effect information on request. 
Firstly, the fact that these are bi-lateral agreements 
reduces the potential benefits flowing to developing 
countries as these countries are likely to be hampered 
in identifying and tracking suspect account holders 
by an ineffective and under-resourced tax administra-
tion. The bi-lateralism of OECD TIEAs has only gener-
ated a few links between a limited number of players. 
2Policy Brief 14· 2012
Secondly, the few agreements in place include, for in-
stance, those between the British Crown Dependen-
cies (Jersey, Guernsey and Isle of Man) and the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland. The mechanism seems open 
to calls of window dressing. Thirdly, TIEAs rely upon 
governments already having in hand precisely the type 
of information that tax havens are designed to conceal, 
and consequently represent a simple case of placing 
the cart before the horse. 
That the OECD deemed any tax haven which signed 
12 TIEAs to be internationally compliant, and that this 
12 might include an agreement between any 2 juris-
dictions indicates significant policy weakness. The 
apparent failure of the OECD initiative to generate 
substantive results in combination with an historical 
conjuncture circumscribed by the financial crisis, re-
cession and a ‘fiscal crisis of the state’ laid the ground 
for the recent shift towards more unilateral moves.
The U.S. Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act
FATCA was enacted in 2010 by the U.S. Congress to 
target avoidance and evasion by U.S. taxpayers using 
foreign accounts. The legislation requires foreign fi-
nancial institutions from 2014 to report to the Inland 
Revenue Service the value and income accruing to ac-
counts held by U.S. taxpayers, or by foreign entities 
in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial interest. 
The legislation covers both accounts held directly and 
those held by corporate entities benefitting U.S. indi-
viduals.
The leverage of FATCA pivots on the importance of 
the U.S. market for intermediaries worldwide. For-
eign Financial Intermediaries are placed in a position 
where non-participation renders them uncompetitive. 
Non-participating intermediaries are subject to a puni-
tive withholding tax on payments from U.S. sources. 
Withholding tax is levied on payments to the foreign 
intermediary as well as those to U.S. individuals, and 
participating intermediaries are required to impose 
the same tax on non-participating intermediaries. Ef-
fectively, a potential policy diffusion process has been 
built into legislative enforcement mechanisms on the 
basis of market power and the threat of direct or indi-
rect market exclusion.
Tones of ‘not in my back yard’ may be evident. How-
ever, features of the agreement provide grounds for 
some optimism. Access to the U.S. market will be de-
pendent on compliance with high levels of informa-
tion exchange. The benefits of this seem to flow large-
ly to the United States, but it may serve as precedent 
for bi-lateral and multilateral exchanges. Notably, any 
firm which is compliant, in being able to identify U.S. 
account holders will necessarily have corresponding 
information on the accounts of other nationals. FAT-
CA then could constitute the basis of cascading reci-
procity.
Europe’s tax haven agenda
The development of a European policy towards tax eva-
sion has been somewhat tortured in the navigation of 
the strictures of the Treaty of Rome and the conflicting 
policies and preferences of its member and associated 
states. In December 1997 the EU Council agreed a set 
of measures to tackle harmful tax competition in the 
EU which included a code of conduct on business tax-
ation, the taxation of savings income and withholding 
taxes on cross border interest and royalty payments. In 
1998 the EU Commission proposed a directive intend-
ed to ensure that a minimum effective tax rate was 
imposed on interest income earned through accounts 
held by a resident taxpayer in a foreign EU country. A 
draft directive was agreed by ECOFIN in November 
2000.
Under the Directive all member states would pro-
vide automatic exchange of information. However, 
the EU’s own tax havens – Austria, Luxembourg and 
Belgium – are afforded a 7 year transition period dur-
ing which they may choose to impose withholding 
tax. The agreement of these jurisdictions relied upon 
equivalent measures being adopted in non-EU mem-
ber states and dependent territories such as Switzer-
land, the U.S. and the Channel Islands. In effect then, 
the insistence on equality of treatment by the EU’s tax 
havens provides a basis for EU policy to constitute a 
multilateral mechanism with the broadest geographi-
cal coverage.
Amendments to the Mutual Assistance Directive 
(COM 2009 29) reinforced this trajectory. First, a 
Most Favoured Nation clause was introduced obliging 
member states to provide another member state the 
level of cooperation they have accepted in relation to a 
third party. Second, it prohibited the reliance on bank 
secrecy for non-residents in a refusal to supply infor-
mation on a taxpayer. This then provides a bridge for 
the transposition of FATCA rules into EU practice and 
weakens the secrecy on which tax havens rely. 
By announcing that the U.S. would not agree to full 
information sharing on U.S. savings accounts held by 
EU residents the Bush administration in 2002 had 
temporarily derailed the progress of EU policy. How-
ever, the European Union Savings Directive (2003/48/
EC) came into force in July 2005 with the limited aim 
of ensuring information exchange or withholding tax 
on interest payments made to the accounts of EU resi-
dents at intermediaries in Europe. The Savings Direc-
tive left EU policy in a curious half way house. Firstly, 
3it could not capture interest payments accruing to 
accounts held by corporate entities rather than indi-
viduals. Changing the identity of the beneficial owner 
from a natural person to a trust or limited company 
meant transparency could be circumvented. Secondly, 
member states could choose either to exchange infor-
mation or withhold. The three European tax havens 
and most of the dependencies of the Netherlands and 
UK chose the withholding model. 
While this impasse remains in place, in February 2011 
the Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the 
Field of Taxation the EU (2011/16/EU) mandated the 
Commission to widen the categories of income that 
member states must report beyond interest payments 
and therefore rendered the EU regime potentially 
compatible with FATCA requirements. This along 
with proposed changes to EU Savings Tax (COM 
2008 7279), which extend the coverage of the Direc-
tive to interest payments to EU residents channelled 
through tax-exempted structures established in non-
EU countries and target the use of structured finan-
cial products that obscure the link between the payer 
and the ultimate beneficiary potentially lends EU pol-
icy real substance. 
In March 2011 the European Commission proposed a 
common system for calculating the tax base of busi-
nesses operating in the EU. The Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) would mean that 
companies would consolidate all profits and losses 
incurred across EU jurisdictions and pay taxes ac-
cording to ‘formulary apportionment’. The proposal 
maintains the sovereign rights of member states to 
set their own corporate tax rate. Group profits will be 
taxed once across the EU and tax revenues, in contrast 
to systems which prioritise legal form over economic 
substance, will be distributed among countries ac-
cording to ‘real economy’ criteria such as sales, capital 
invested and employee numbers. While at present the 
proposal remains mired in the conflicting preferenc-
es of member states, it is notable that the Financial 
Transaction Tax has been established in the absence 
of unanimity. It may be that the CCCTB can be car-
ried forward on a minority basis under the ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ procedure. 
Under the direction of Algirdas Šemeta, Commis-
sioner responsible for taxation and customs union, 
audit and anti-fraud, the EU is accelerating its ef-
forts to tackle tax havens. The immanent release by 
the Commission of a statement of intention, ‘An Ac-
tion Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and 
tax evasion’, is likely to compound the accelerating 
trend. While progress in the fight against tax havens 
has been slow, haphazard and hampered by the EU 
Treaty and divergent interests amongst members, a 
certain direction of travel is discernible. The EU Sav-
ings Directive and the Directive on Administrative Co-
operation in the Field of Taxation contain the seeds of 
automatic exchange with non-member countries and 
dependencies in the form of built-in mechanisms of 
extension. The strategy of ‘not in my backyard’, which 
the EU shares with the U.S., may, perhaps ironically, 
be the wellspring of an effective multilateral mecha-
nism. 
An Elephant in the Room
Agreements struck between Switzerland on one hand 
and Germany and the UK on the other cloud what 
might otherwise seem sunny horizons. Amidst the 
rising tide of debate and policy, Switzerland, the home 
of some 27% of global wealth, has opted to pursue 
a withholding tax strategy. Under the ‘rubik’ agree-
ments Switzerland will, in lieu of exchanging infor-
mation on the accounts of non-Swiss residents, tax 
investment income and capital gains at an agreed rate 
varying according to country and income category. A 
one-off charge will be levied against accreted principal 
to compensate for past tax evasion. The agreements 
also allow Swiss account holders to relocate to other 
tax havens and avoid paying the lump sum or with-
holding at all.
These agreements represent a blueprint for an alter-
native to the emergent information exchange regime. 
The choice is stark. The withholding model condones 
tax evasion by default. Evaders are in effect allowed to 
pay a fine for past misdemeanours but are not forced 
to defer from such behaviour in future. Further, the 
model institutionalises the differential capacity of the 
most wealthy to utilise tax havens in a way that is not 
available to less mobile parts of the economy. Third, 
there is no mechanism built into the Swiss model 
which would encourage the emergence of a multilat-
eral system the benefits of which could be made avail-
able to developing and developed countries alike. 
Conclusions
Under pressure from civil society organisations, elec-
torates unlikely to tolerate an overtly skewed distribu-
tion of the tax burden, large fiscal gaps and a so far 
elusive search for renewed growth, the politics of tax 
have risen to the top of the agenda. Within this con-
juncture, both the U.S. and the EU have taken sub-
stantive unilateral steps towards reconfiguring their 
relationships with some offshore jurisdictions. These 
steps, while still nascent, promise both a significant 
curb on tax evasion and a more transparent global fi-
nancial system. However, progress is fragile and a less 
coherent admixture of initiatives enacted by individual 
countries remains a genuine prospect.
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In looking forward, 4 issues might deserve highlight-
ing:
• It is likely that some jurisdictions will be subject to 
calls of hypocrisy. The U.S. and UK host perhaps 
the largest of offshore centres. A sense of indigna-
tion in the face of this contradiction may under-
mine multilateral potential.
• The rise of China and the Singaporean tax haven 
may pose an insurmountable barrier to universal 
regulation. Politics among the BRICS may be de-
finitive in the future shape of global tax regulation.
• The EU may need to transgress the strictures of the 
Treaty to enforce its preferences on EU tax havens 
and EU member state dependencies. Unanimity 
cannot be counted on.
• The OECD may need to reconsider its role in this 
arena moving from the generator of global initia-
tives to acting as a technical forum to facilitate the 
integration of distinct policy initiatives.
